In the coming weeks and months, various causes will be advanced for the blackout. Initially, a fire at a New York City power plant was the cause. Later, focus shifted to Canada.  ^2/  Now, attention is riveted to power generation and transmission problems in Ohio.

The blackout was not caused by mere equipment malfunctions. It is the direct result of the ill-conceived 1992 Energy Policy Act and the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission's (FERC) 1996 Order No. 888. These Federal actions seriously eroded the reliability of the nation's electrical grid.

The federal government's failure to make system reliability a mainstay of its deregulation process caused the blackout. Order 888 gave open and equal access to the transmission grid. The goals of Order 888 were to foster an increase in competition, increase efficiency, and lower energy costs. What we have seen in the wake of Order 888 are (1) attempts by some utilities to stifle competition and monopolize the energy trading market (Enron, The Williams Companies, et al), (2) a decrease in efficiency (the 1996 West Coast and 2003 East Coast blackouts), and (3) significantly higher energy costs across the nation.

To make matters worse, FERC improperly delegated authority for system reliability to an industry trade group, the North American Electric Reliability Council (NERC). NERC is an organization funded wholly by utility companies.

NERC's emphasis is not system reliability as they claim -- but transaction accountability. In effect, NERC is the clearinghouse for financial transactions involving the nation's power generators and transmission line operators. NERC's transaction information system (TIS) was so successful that Enron's wholesale energy trading operation was able to leverage its use to defraud the nation.

Compliance with NERC standards by utilities, power generators, and ISO's (Independent System Operators that mange transmission lines) is strictly voluntary. This alone demonstrates the lack of seriousness that the NERC and the utility industry give reliability. Even if we assume that NERC's standards are not fundamentally flawed -- a dubious assumption at best -- the record shows they are not working. ^3/

Michehl Ghent, CEO of NERC has claimed embarrassment and shock at the magnitude of the blackout.  He ought to be upset. NERC has  been exposed for what it really is -- a chit processing facility for the "wheeling" of power from one company to another.

This is clearly shown by its own report on the reliability of the nation's electrical gird. In its report, Reliability Assessment 2002-2011  - The Reliability of Bulk Electric Systems in North America, NERC discusses New York City's shortage of power.

"Based on projected demand growth, New York City will not meet these local capacity requirements beyond 2002 unless additional new resources within the city become available."

Another trouble spot in the region is Connecticut.

"The 2001 and 2003 ISO New England Regional transmission studies have identified that there are severe reliability problems in southwestern Connecticut due to inadequate capability to import power... The peak demand in southwest Connecticut is forecast to be 1.5 times the amount of local generation... "

As for the focus of the investigation -- Ohio -- NERC has something to offer on this area as well.

"Power flows circulating around Lake Erie... have often limited the ability of the Michigan systems to receive firm purchases from Ontario... local transmission overloads are possible during some generation and transmission contingencies."

 Is it any coincidence that these areas were all affected by the blackout? What we now know is that the Northeast United States is critically short of power. So much power is being imported into the region that the transmission infrastructure is inadequate to handle the load. One transient can cause a system breakdown stretching from New York to Michigan.

As nervous politicians and scurrying utility managers seek to convince us that a mere mechanical breakdown was the cause of the blackout, let us not forget that it was the human systems that failed us.

Footnotes

1/ As usual, we can point to a failure of our elected government: The US Congress for its inability to craft a national energy policy; Four Presidents, Reagan, Bush, Clinton and Bush; The Energy Department and FERC.

2/ The Canadians have nothing to do with the failure of the US electrical system. Such a charge demonstrates the desperation that some are feeling with regard to an event that should never have happened.

 3/ Twenty-one power plants were disconnected ("tripped") from the grid within three minutes of the start of the blackout.  Common sense demands that in the event of a network transient, service areas be isolated ("islands") to prevent a cascading failure of the type that took 21 power plants off-line. NERC's voluntary standards do not work.