quarterly-report.com Political Commentary
|
![]() |
Seven More Deaths |
||
|
NASA - Safety Is Not Our Concern |
||
by James R. Audet |
February 7, 2003
19th Anniversary of the first untethered space walk by Astronaut Bruce McCandless of Space Shuttle Orbiter Challenger (STS-41B)
The loss of the Space Shuttle Orbiter Columbia (STS-107)and its seven astronauts have once again shown that the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) has no concern for the safety of its manned spaced program. This bureaucratic cesspool is infested with the most egocentric, narcissistic, imprudent group of mangers to have ever inhabited the Washington swamp.
Anyone who has been paying the slightest attention to the space shuttle program knew that another catastrophic disaster was just waiting to happen. NASA learned nothing from the 1986 loss of the Space Shuttle Orbiter Challenger (STS-51L) and the deaths of its seven astronauts except how to fire its engineers and conduct a public relations spin campaign.

Photograph of Challenger Liftoff (STS-41B) February 3, 1984
We hear the same nonsense today from NASA Shuttle Program Manager, Ron Dittemore, as we heard in 1986. We are left to wonder how Dittemore can characterize the deaths of the seven Columbia astronauts as an incident, or an event, or simply a mishap. NASA Shuttle Flight Director Milt Heflin claimed in a news conference the afternoon of Columbia's destruction that "we will fix it." How does this idiot intend to "fix" seven deaths. Of course, he refers to the program, not the people. It is the program that must continue. It is Heflin's self-indulgent career that must continue. Fire these men. Terminate the program.
Columbia's destruction proves that NASA did not reinvent itself after the Challenger disaster. It still compromises safety. Regretfully, its failures are systemic.
United States manned space flight began in 1961 with the sub-orbital flight of Alan B. Shepard in Freedom 7. The first generation of NASA managers are responsible for the deaths of White, Grissom, and Chaffee in the Apollo 1 launch pad fire on January 27, 1967. Nineteen (19) years later, Generation No. 2 of NASA managers are accountable for the deaths of the Challenger astronauts. Seventeen (17) years after Challenger, Generation No. 3 of NASA managers are liable for the deaths of the seven Columbia astronauts. The pattern is obvious, chronic and outrageous. Each generation of NASA managers has made fatal errors in safety. The agency is incapable learning from its mistakes.

Photograph of Challenger Launch (STS-41B) February 3, 1984
The United States is in over its manned space flight head. NASA's love affair for an orbiting space station caused it to divert resources from Shuttle Orbiter safety so that it could showcase its ability to participate in a new world order of international cooperation in space. In the secret offices of its Independence Square headquarters, NASA managers whispered,
"Let us bury the
fact that we are relying on a first generation prototype
vehicle to
get us back and forth to this space station. Let us cover-up
the
fact that
we have dismissed, laid off, or fired engineers and cut safety
programs to make up
for the cost overruns on the space station. Let us
not forget that the temporal
appearance of success gets us further
congressional
funding."
NASA has loss 40 percent of the Shuttle Orbiter fleet. This appalling performance record demonstrates clear, undeniable proof of mismanagement of the manned space flight program. The United States has three Orbiters remaining in service, Atlantis, Endeavor and Discovery to carry out NASA's overly ambitious goals.
Let us say to Russia and Japan, you pay for the international space station (ISS), and, by the way, you all figure out how to get back and forth.
NASA snake oil salesmen would have you believe they can meet program goals with a budget that belies the true cost of safety. Let us send NASA Administrator Sean O'Keefe and his managers of death packing. They have cost seven astronauts their lives.
Footnotes:
1/ Prior NASA Administrator, Daniel Goldin, bears responsibility for the loss of the Columbia. He gutted the Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel. Link 1, Link 2. Goldin has been nominated, subject to stockholder approval, to the Board of Directors of Lucent Technologies. Let Lucent know he is an unacceptable choice.
quarterly report |
Analysis |
quarterly report |
Commentary |
quarterly report |
The Novel |
quarterly report |
Click on this sentence for the terms that govern your use of this web site.
quarterly-report.com |
© 1999-2004 James R. Audet All Rights Reserved |